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CORNELIUS V. NUTT AND THE CURRENT STATE
OF ARBITRAL REMEDIAL AUTHORITY IN THE
FEDERAL SECTOR
DEAN CLEMENT BERRY*
The subject of remedies is one of the most controversial and complex areas
in the law of arbitration. Although there is no serious dispute over whether
arbitrators can formulate and order remedies, questions frequently arise over
the source and scope of arbitral remedial power. Nowhere is this more evi-
dent than in federal sector labor arbitration, particularly now that the Supreme
Court has decided Cornelius v. Nutt.'
Congress specifically authorized arbitration as a grievance resolution
mechanism for federal employees when it enacted the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978 (CSRA)." The CSRA provides that federal sector collective bargain-
ing agreements must contain a grievance procedure that provides for binding
arbitration in the event that a settlement of a disputed personnel action is not
otherwise reached. The CSRA also established the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB), a more formal adjudicative body, which deals with certain
employee grievances. Most federal employees, regardless of whether they are
union members, can use the MSPB's statutory procedures in seeking relief
from agency actions, provided they meet certain jurisdictional requirements.
Given this dual system of grievance resolution and the fact that certain
federal employees can choose between the two forums in some cases, con-
cerns have arisen over a perceived lack of consistency in the resolution of
federal employee grievances. In the years immediately following passage of
the CSRA, the federal appellate courts struggled with the problem of inter-
forum consistency as they were called upon to review arbitration awards. The
issues addressed generally centered on whether arbitrators were bound to apply
the same standards, procedures, and precedents in resolving employee
grievances that had been utilized by the MSPB. The Supreme Court provided
at least a partial answer to these questions in Cornelius v. Nutt, where it ruled
that an arbitrator had to apply the MSPB's definition of "harmful error"
in determining whether an employee was entitled to relief because of agency
errors in processing an adverse action. The Court based this result in part
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Berkeley (Boalt Hall); LL.M., 1986, George Washington University. Member of the Bar of the
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upon its view that permitting a different harmful error standard in each forum
would lead to inconsistent results and forum shopping. Hence, the Court held
that a uniform standard based on the MSPB definition must control in each
forum.
An issue raised by Cornelius v. Nutt is whether the rationale of the case
extends to arbitral remedial authority. In essence, it can now be argued that
because of the need to promote consistent results, arbitrators hearing cases
that also could have been brought before the MSPB must formulate remedies
equivalent to those the MSPB would apply in the same case. This article ad-
dresses this argument and offers an alternative view of the effect of Cornelius
v. Nutt on arbitral remedial authority. Part I discusses both the MSPB and
federal sector arbitration and explains the overlapping scheme of grievance
resolution. Part II delineates efforts by the appellate courts to deal with prob-
lems raised by this dual system and presents a detailed discussion and analysis
of Cornelius v. Nutt. Part III then gives a brief overview of the respective
remedial powers of the MSPB and federal sector arbitrators. Finally, Part
IV recognizes the arguments that favor a single standard for developing
remedies regardless of whether a dispute is resolved by an arbitrator or by
the MSPB, but argues that because of both inherent differences between these
forums and the need for arbitral finality, Cornelius v. Nutt should not be
read so broadly. Accordingly, part IV concludes that certain disparities in
the formulation and application of remedies, when otherwise permissible under
federal civil service law, should not be grounds for setting aside or modifying
an arbitration award.
I. Background: The Civil Service Reform Act and Federal Employee
Grievance Resolution
The Merit Systems Protection Board
The central purpose of the CSRA: was to revise, simplify, and reorganize
the vast array of statutes governing the expansive federal civil service system.
The earlier rules and procedures were perceived by many as providing a sanc-
tuary for incompetent employees and as making it inordinately difficult to
remove civil service employees whose performance contributed little to govern-
ment operations or efficiency. However, the CSRA was also a response to
long-standing concerns that civil service employees should be protected from
the arbitrary actions of agency heads whose adverse personnel actions were
too often the product of short-term political expediency and not long-term
interest in good government. To mediate between these two competing goals,
Congress established the MSPB. The MSPB is an independent, three-member
agency charged with protecting merit principles in the federal civil service and
with adjudicating certain disputes between civil service employees and their
agencies. MSPB members are appointed by the President, subject to Senate
3. See U.SC. §§ 1201-1205 (1982). The CSRA also established the Office of the Special Counsel.
It is responsible for investigating and prosecuting prohibited personnel practices, employment dis-
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confirmation, and serve nonrenewable seven-year terms. No more than two
members may be from the same political party and a member can only be
removed for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance of office.
4
Congress limited MSPB jurisdiction to "appealable actions." These fall in-
to five major categories: (1) adverse actions; (2) performance-related actions;
(3) within-grade increase denials; (4) reduction-in-force actions; and (5)
retirement-related actions.5 Because the interforum consistency issue is most
often raised during adjudication of the first two categories of appealable ac-
tions, this article focuses solely upon how adverse actions and performance-
related actions are handled by the MSPB and by grievance arbitration and
how the respective remedies in these two types of actions are formulated and
applied. 6
Section 7512 of the CSRA defines an adverse action as an action by an
administrative agency against an employee that consists of removal, suspension
for more than fourteen days, reduction in grade, reduction in pay, or furlough
of thirty days or less. Chapter 75 actions are normally limited to disciplinary
actions for misconduct and are appealable only by "employees. 1 7 In order
to take an adverse action, the agency must give the employee thirty days ad-
vance written notice of the charges.8 This notice must explain the charges
and be specific enough to permit an informed reply. 9
An adverse action may be taken by an agency for "such cause as will pro-
mote the efficiency of the service."'" This standard has been interpreted to
mean that when an adverse action is based on misconduct, the agency must
show a nexus between that conduct and the efficiency of the service." Among
those incidents which have been held sufficient to support an adverse action
are: lying about qualifications on employment applications,'
2 insubordination,' 3
crimination, unlawful political activities, arbitrary withholding of information requested under
the Freedom of Information Act, and any other violations of federal civil service law. Id. §§ 1204,
1206.
4. Id. §§ 1201, 1202.
5. See E. BussEy, FEDERAL Cvu. SERvIcE LAw AND PRocE uRFls: A BAsIc GUIDE 20 (1984).
6. See infra part II.
7. "Employees" are defined as those individuals appointed into the competitive service who
have completed a probationary period, or as preference eligible employees in the excepted service
who have completed one year of current and continuous serivce. All civilian positions in the
executive branch are in the competitive service unless otherwise excepted by the Office of Per-
sonnel Management. 5 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1982). The first year of appointment in the competitive
service is considered probationary and no appeal to the MSPB is available unless the employee
is alleging the adverse action was based on discrimination on the basis of marital status or political
affiliation. Bates v. Department of the Navy, 6 M.S.P.B. 279 (1981). Preference eligible employees
are defined at 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (1982) and generally refer to veterans of the armed forces who
were discharged under honorable conditions.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1) (1982).
9. Hendricks v. Department of the Interior, 9 M.S.P.B. 584 (1982).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982).
11. Merritt v. Department of Justice, 6 M.S.P.B. 493 (1981).
12. Klein v. Department of Labor, 6 M.S.P.B. 249 (1981).
13. Bradbie v. EEOC, 705 F.2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
19871
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falsifying government documents,'" and misusing or misappropriating govern-
ment property. 15 Although homicide, for example, is usually considered such
an "egregious circumstance" that the requisite nexus can be presumed," the
authorities are split as to whether particularly serious off-duty conduct, such
as child molestation, can also constitute a per se nexus.'
7
Agencies are permitted, under Chapter 43 of the CSRA, to remove or demote
employees whose performance has been unacceptable." Such actions usually
are justified only after periodic appraisals of an employee's job performance
and concomitant failure by the employee to perform one or more "critical
elements" associated with his position. 19 "Critical elements" are defined as
those aspects of an employee's job that are so important that "unacceptable
performance on the element would result in unacceptable performance in the
position." ' 20 As with Chapter 75 adverse actions, an employee must be given
thirty days written notice before a performance-based action can be taken,
and the employee is also entitled to respond to any allegations orally and/or
in writing. 2' Additionally, appeal to the MSPB is limited to competitive ser-
vice employees or preference eligibles who have completed one year of ser-
vice. 22 Unlike adverse actions, however, the procedures that are required for
taking performance-based actions also apply to all excepted service employees.23
The standards of review applied by the MSPB when considering adverse
actions and performance-related actions differ markedly. Adverse action cases
are sustained by the MSPB only when the action was taken for "such cause
as will promote the efficiency of the service" and "is supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence." 2 Thus, the MSPB will uphold an agency decision under
Chapter 75 only when the agency has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the employee committed the misdeeds with which he is charged
and that imposition of the discipline will promote the efficiency of the ser-
vice. A more deferential standard of review, however, applies to Chapter 43
actions as a result of Congress' desire that the difficulties of proof associated
with Chapter 75 cases not carry over to cases brought pursuant to Chapter
43.25 Hence, agency action under the latter provision is upheld by the MSPB
if it is supported on the record by substantial evidence.
26
14. Filson v. Department of Transp., 7 M.S.P.B. 50 (1981).
15. Amell v. General Servs. Admin., 7 M.S.P.B. 382 (1981).
16. Gueory v. Hampton, 510 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
17. Compare Doe v. National Security Agency, 6 M.S.P.B. 467 (1981) (nexus presumed)
with D.E. v. Department of the Navy, 21 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1377 (1983) (no presump-
tion of nexus).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4315 (1982).
19. Id. § 4301(3).
20. 5 C.F.R. § 430.202(e) (1987).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(1) (1982).
22. Id. § 4303(e).
23. Id. § 4301(2) defines an "employee" as "an individual employed in or under an agency."
24. Id. §§ 7503(a), 7701(c)(1)(B).
25. See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
26. See generally Borinkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.B. 150 (1981); Wells v. Harris,
1 M.S.P.B. 199 (1979).
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Arbitration Under the CSRA
In 1962 federal employees were officially granted organizational and bargain-
ing rights by Executive Order No. 10,988. These rights were extended by Execu-
tive Order No. 11,491 in 1969, which made changes to coordinate, strengthen,
and clarify the program. Among other things, Executive Order No. 11,491
required that any collective bargaining agreement include a negotiated grievance
procedure as the exclusive grievance procedure for employees governed by
a collective bargaining agreement. The order did not require arbitration as
part of the procedure. However, if the parties chose to arbitrate grievances,
conventional nonadvisory arbitration was required. Arbitrators were given the
authority to conclusively resolve disputes over collective bargaining agreements,
but the parties could file exceptions to the arbitration decision with the Federal
Labor Relations Council. 27 The opportunity for appeal of an arbitrator's deci-
sion to the Council, various delays associated with the Executive Order ar-
bitration scheme, and the intrusion of outside agencies (e.g., the Comptroller
General) challenging the legality of arbitral awards resulted in many com-
plaints about the system and led many to conclude that reform of these pro-
cedures was needed.28 Accordingly, improving federal sector arbitration was
a prime concern of the drafters of the CSRA.
Continuing what it intended to be a trend toward enhancing meaningful
bargaining rights for federal employees, Congress included in the CSRA the
first codification of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for federal
employees. Section 7121 of the Act required that all collective bargaining
agreements in the federal sector provide for binding arbitration as part of
the negotiated grievance procedure. The procedure was to be "fair and sim-
ple" and "provide for expeditious processing" of grievances. 29 As in private
sector arbitration, a core function of federal sector arbitration procedures is
to assure compliance with collective bargaining agreements. Federal sector ar-
bitration, however, has a second key function-to assure compliance with con-
trolling laws, rules, and regulations covering federal employment by agency
employers. According to one noted commentator, this dual role of federal
sector arbitration was a principal factor in Congress' decision:
(1) to specify that each collective agreement in the federal sector
"shall" provide a grievance procedure with arbitration, (2) to
specify that all grievances "shall" be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedures except those specifically excluded by the col-
27. For a detailed discussion of grievance procedures under the executive orders, see, e.g.,
Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service, 45 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 712 (1977); Aronin,
Collective Bargaining in the Federal Service: A Balanced Approach, 44 Gao. WAsH. L. Rv.
576 (1976).
28. See Gamser, Back-Seat Driving Behind the Back-Seat Driver: Arbitration in the Federal
Sector, in PROCEEDINGS oF THE31ST ANN. MEETING or THE NATIONAL AcADEMY or ARBITRATORS
273 (1979); Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: How Final and Binding?, 51
OR. L. RExv. 134 (1971).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a), (b) (1982).
1987]
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lective agreement or statute; and (3) to define the term "grievance"
very broadly.0
Generally speaking, all grievances are automatically covered by the grievance
procedure unless excluded by agreement of the parties or by statute.,, A
grievance, in turn, is broadly defined as any complaint:
(A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the
employment of the employee;
(B) by any labor organization concerning any matter relating
to the employment of any employee; or
(C) by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning-
(i) the effect or interpretation, or a claim of breach, of
a collective bargaining agreement; or
(ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplica-
tion of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions
of employment.
32
Federal sector grievances can be divided into four different types of disputes.
First, there are "pure grievances." Pure grievances do not involve reduction
or removal for unacceptable performance, removal or suspension for more
than fourteen days, reduction in grade or pay, furlough of thirty days or more,
or a complaint of discrimination. In these cases, employees must resort either
to a collectively negotiated grievance procedure or to the agency's own
grievance procedure. Second, there are "pure discrimination" cases. These
involve allegations of discrimination that do not raise matters appealable to
the MSPB. Ini;tead, available forums include grievance arbitration, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission procedures, the federal district courts,
and sequential combinations of the foregoing. Third, there are "mixed cases."
These involve allegations of unlawful discrimination together with another
complaint, p erhaps one involving an adverse action under Chapter 75. The
forums for mibed cases are the same as those covering pure discrimination
cases, except that a grieving employee may also elect to appeal directly to
the MSPB and from there to federal district court.3"
Finally, where the collective bargaining agreement does not exclude appeal-
able actions under Chapters 43 or 75 from its grievance system, bargaining
unit members may use either the negotiated grievance procedure or the MSPB
statutory appeal procedure in cases involving adverse actions or performance-
related actions.3 4 When an employee has a choice of procedures, however,
the forum where he files first is the forum where he must remain. 35
30. F.,ELKorXm & E. ELKouRi, How ARBnUTAION WoRKs 52-53 (4th ed. 1985).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (1982).
32. Id. § 7103(a)(9).
33. See F. ELKoum & E. EucouR, supra note 30, at 54-55 for a detailed examination of
the various channels available for processing federal sector employment grievances. See also White,
The Review Process for Labor Arbitration in the Federal Sector, 35 LAB. L.J. 35, 36-37 (1984).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(e) (1982).
35. Id. § 7121(d).
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II. The Problem of Alternative Forums
The Early Cases
Because of the availability to some employees of different, mutually exclu-
sive forums for the appeal of adverse and performance-based actions taken
against them, disputes arose concerning whether, and to what extent, federal
arbitrators and the MSPB were required to apply the same standards in resolv-
ing cases. To promote consistency and discourage forum shopping, Congress
provided that an employee's choice of procedural routes should not affect
the applicable standard of review applied in either forum. Thus, section
7121(e)(2) of the CSRA requires that arbitrators apply the same evidentiary
standards as the MSPB would in its review of agency actions. Similarly, cer-
tain arbitral decisions are subject to judicial review "in the same manner and
under the same conditions as if the matter had been decided by the Board
[MSPB]." '36 Despite this statutory guidance, however, important questions in-
volving the relationship between standards applied in the respective forums
continued to trouble courts during the initial consideration of these cases.
In Devine v. White,3 for example, the United States District Court for
the District'of Columbia reviewed an arbitrator's award in an adverse action
case. The employee, Noe Lopez, was an agent for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Lopez was involved in an accident while driving
a government vehicle "for purposes other than official business." 3 8 More than
four months after the accident, the INS advised Lopez that it intended to
suspend him for thirty days without pay. In addition, the agency advised him
that he could either appeal to the MSPB or ask his union to pursue a grievance
through the arbitration mechanism established by the applicable collective
bargaining agreement. Lopez chose the latter.
At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found that Lopez had violated
federal law and INS rules but ordered the agency to reverse the suspension,
citing the lack of either timely investigation or timely administration of
discipline, both violations of procedures set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement. 9 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) entered the case
at this point and petitioned the arbitrator to reconsider his decision."0 The
arbitrator rejected the petition because it contained materials not introduced
at the earlier hearing and because he had no authority to reconsider after
rendering a final decision. OPM then went to the court of appeals, arguing
that the arbitrator had incorrectly applied the MSPB's harmful error stan-
36. Id. § 7121(0.
37. 697 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 426 (quoting Arbitrator's Decision 6, reprinted in Joint Appendix 46, 52).
39. Id.
40. Under sections 7703(d) and 7121(0 of the CSRA, the Director of OPM may petition
for review of an arbitrator's decision if it will have a substantial impact on civil service laws,
rules, or regulations. The burden of showing this impact is on the Director. Devine v. Sutermeister,
724 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1987]
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dard.4 ' OPM contended that an agency decision supported by the
preponderance of the evidence could be reversed on procedural grounds (i.e.,
lack of either timely investigation or timely administration of discipline) only
if the employee demonstrated that the defect constituted harmful error. Under
the MSPB definition of this term, a harmful error is one that "might have
caused the agency to reach a conclusion different than the one reached."
42
In addition, under MSPB case law, the burden of proving the defense of harm-
ful error rests on the employee.4 3 Since no previous case had held that the
MSPB's harmful error standard applied in arbitral proceedings, the court found
it necessary to examine the history of the CSRA for guidance.
After observing that "the Act [CSRA] is fraught with ambiguities, pep-
pered with provisions that appear at cross purposes, and often lacking any
useful legislative history, ' 44 Judge Edwards nevertheless was able to discern
several guiding principles from the statute's provisions. He noted that under
the standard of review established by the CSRA, the Board must uphold an
agency decision "supported by a preponderance of the evidence," ' 4 unless
the employee shows, among other things, "harmful error in the application
of the agency's procedures in arriving at such decision."146 Although he noted
the plausibility of an argument that the harmful error standard did not apply
to arbitration, Judge Edwards rejected this reading of the statute for two
reasons. First, he concluded that the harmful error standard had to be incor-
porated into arbitral proceedings because section 7701(c)(1) of the Act (in-
volving the burden of proof in challenges to agency actions) applies under
its own terms to section 7701(c)(2) (containing the harmful error standard).47
Therefore, the fact that section 7121(e)(2) 41 only provides that an arbitrator
is governed by section 7701(c)(1) does not exempt arbitration from the harm-
ful error standard set forth in section 7701(c)(2). Second, Judge Edwards
pointed out that Congress intended to promote consistency and to discourage
forum shopping in the resolution of these cases. Allowing arbitrators to reverse
an adverse action for procedural reasons without finding harmful error,
41. Under Ihe standard of review established for adverse action cases, the MSPB must sus-
tain an agency action supported by the preponderance of the evidence unless the employee can
show, among other things, "harmful error in the application of the agency's procedures in arriving
at such decision." 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) (1982). Although the CSRA does not define "harmful
error," its legislative history indicates that reversal of an agency action is appropriate only if
the procedures followed "substantially prejudiced the employee's rights." S. RP. No. 969, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 2723, 2786.
42. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3) (1982). See also Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, I M.S.P.B.
489, 493 (1980) ("Unless it is likely that an alleged error affected the result, its occurrence cannot
have been prejudicial").
43. Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 M.S.P.B. at 492.
44. Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 441 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) (1982)).
46. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) (1982)).
47. Id. Section 7701(c)(1) provides that it is "subject to" section 7701(c)(2).
48. Section 7121(e)(2) governs Chapter 43 and Chapter 75 cases brought to arbitration.
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something the MSPB refrained frorh doing in its cases, would frustrate this
congressional intent.
4 9
Even within these constraints, however, Judge Edwards suggested a broad
view of both arbitral authority and the scope of a collective bargaining
agreement:
[W]here the parties to a collective bargaining agreement negotiate
concerning the timing of disciplinary actions or other matters and
impose specific procedural requirements in their agreement, it may
be possible to find "harmful error" even absent evidence that the
violation led to a loss of evidence or other measurable effects. We
believe, in other words, that a violation of a clear provision of
a collective bargaining agreement could constitute "harmful error"
under the theory that some bargained-for procedural rights are,
by definition, substantial rights of an employee.
[T]he inclusion of a valuable procedural safeguard, such as a
requirement that discipline be administered in a timely manner,
can constitute persuasive evidence that the employees attach con-
siderable importance to it. 0
Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the arbitrator for reconsidera-
tion based on the harmful error rule. The court specifically directed the arbi-
trator to determine
(1) whether the error affected the outcome of the disciplinary pro-
ceeding, or (2) whether the collective bargaining agreement between
the INS and the Union established the timely notice requirement
as one of such importance to the employees that a violation should
be considered harmful even in the absence of a showing that the
delay affected the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding."
On remand, the arbitrator indicated that the delay did not affect the outcome
of the disciplinary proceedings. Regarding the second issue, however, he found
that inclusion of the timely notice requirement in the collective bargaining
agreement was of such importance that the delay had to be considered harm-
ful. On that basis, he adhered to his original decision to overturn the
discipline.52
In Local 2578, American Federation of Government Employees v. General
Services Administration,3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
49. 697 F.2d at 441.
50. Id. at 443. Such an analysis would not be appropriate in the aftermath of Cornelius
v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985). See infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
51. 697 F.2d at 443-44.
52. See White, supra note 33, for a discussion of the subsequent history of this case. Mr.
White was the arbitrator in Devine v. White.
53. 711 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
1987]
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Circuit again confronted the problem. The court of appeals reviewed an arbi-
trator's decision involving the discharge of an employee accused of stealing
government property. The employee, Joseph T. Moore, had told a supervisor
that on several occasions he had helped a fellow National Archives employee
steal money from mail sent to the National Archives. In so confessing, Moore
had, in the court's words, "actfed] on his own initiative, and pursuant to
conscience.""' Moore subsequently pled guilty in a criminal proceeding to theft
of government property and, after explaining that he never took any money
himself, was sentenced to one year's probation. Although it had initially taken
no disciplinary action, the General Services Administration (GSA) notified
Moore on the day he was sentenced that it intended to fire him because of
his offense. " Despite the presence of strong mitigating evidence and a plea
from Moore's union steward that the penalty be reduced to a reprimand, 6
the GSA adhered to its decision to discharge Moore."
The union initiated grievance proceedings on Moore's behalf, which ulti-
mately resulted in arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that theft normally
constitutes just cause for discharge and that the severity of the penalty was
within the discretion of the agency. The arbitrator noted, however, that the
GSA apparently did not consider the request by Moore's probation officer
that Moore be allowed to keep his job. Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered
the GSA to reconsider its decision, adding that if the GSA adhered to its
decision to dismiss, he would not find that it had violated the collective bargain-
ing agreement. After reconsidering, the GSA adhered to its decision; and the
union petitioned for review in the court of appeals.58
On appeal, the union argued that the arbitrator erred in deferring to the
GSA's decision concerning the severity of the penalty. The union argued that
since arbitral and MSPB decisions are governed by the same standards and
the MSPB can independently assess the severity of penalties imposed by agen-
cies,59 arbitrators must necessarily possess the same power. 60 In response, the
court stated that "nothing in the CSRA requires that arbitration and MSPB
actions always adhere to the same standards and procedures or produce the
same results in like cases." 61 Nevertheless, the court agreed with the union
that the arbitrator's failure to assess independently the severity of the penalty
required remand for such consideration. 6
The court cited Devine v. White for the proposition that judicial review
54. Id. at 2.52.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 262-63. Apparently, Moore had cooperated fully with postal investigators. In addition,
his parole offie.r requested that Moore be allowed to keep his job.
57. Id. at 263.
58. Id.
59. See Parsons v. Department of the Air Force, 707 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
60. 711 F.2d at 263.
61. Id. at 264.
62. Id.
[Vol. 40:559
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss4/12
ARBITRAL REMEDIAL AUTHORITY
of arbitral decisions should be limited.63 Nevertheless, casting notions of
deference aside and stating that the principal problem in the case was not
the arbitrator's decision per se "but the manner in which it was reached,"
the court concluded that the arbitrator had abdicated his responsibility to fully
consider the grievance. 6" Noting congressional intent that there be some sym-
metry between arbitration and MSPB proceedings "in order '[tlo promote
consistency and to discourage forum shopping' ,' 6S the court held that the
inequity of having an arbitrator with less authority to review penalties than
that possessed by the MSPB was self-evident since employees would probably
be more inclined to choose the forum that had the greatest power to reduce
the penalty. 66 The court drew a parallel with private-sector arbitration, noting
that in the private sector the power of the arbitrator to consider the appropri-
ateness of an employer's penalty was "[s]o central to [his] authority" that
even if a collective bargaining agreement failed to authorize mitigation, the
power to decide just cause was inherent in arbitral authority.
61
Thus, both Devine v. White and AFGE Local 2578 recognized the need
for consistency between forums when resolving standard of review issues. Local
2578 went beyond the procedural aspects of applying harmful error, however,
and stated that forum consistency considerations were also important to the
issue of mitigation. Nevertheless, the court tempered this result by positing
that arbitrators were not necessarily bound by MSPB results in similar cases.
Apparently, forum consistency at this point did not equate with firm adherence
to MSPB precedent.
The problem of relating arbitral authority to that of the MSPB arose again
in Devine v. Sutermeister," but this time the issue arose in the newly established
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 69 In Sutermeister the court was asked
to consider whether a federal sector arbitrator is bound to follow MSPB
precedents in resolving grievances filed under negotiated procedures. The case
involved the Custom Service's dismissal of an employee who had withheld
from his employment application information concerning his prior arrest and
conviction record. The dispute was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator
found that the employee had deliberately failed to list various motor vehicle
offenses and a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. The arbitrator
found, however, that the agency had been dilatory in starting its investigation
of the matter and that the employee's removal would not promote the effi-
63. Id. at 264-65 (citing Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). See infra
notes 168-178 for a general discussion of judicial deference to arbitration in the federal sector.
64. 711 F.2d at 265.
65. Id. (quoting Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
66. The court concluded that the MSPB's authority to weigh the severity of penalties in adverse
action cases was firmly established in Douglas v. Veteran's Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981).
711 F.2d at 265.
67. Id. at 266.
68. 724 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
69. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982), vested this court
with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in all final decisions of the MSPB.
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ciency of the service. The arbitrator then reduced the penalty to a thirty-day
suspension, with reinstatement and back pay."0 OPM petitioned for review
and asked the court to reverse the arbitrator's award, arguing that he erred
in not applying the standards set forth in Douglas v. Veteran's Administra-
tion for mitigation of penalties."'
The court declined to address the general principle of arbitral adherence
to MSPB precedent, however, stating:
We need not decide whether an arbitrator is always or never bound
by MSPB precedents. It will suffice to say that the arbitrator here
did not err by not specifically addressing himself to the Douglas
opinion, as we find no conflict between the arbitrator's opinion
and the MSPB's decision in Douglas.72
Nevertheless, the court stated in dicta that there was nothing in the legislative
history of the CSRA to support the proposition that an arbitrator is bound
by MSPB precedents. The court distinguished Devine v. White" and its own
earlier opinion, Devine v. Nutt," as having dealt only with the "statutory
standard of review." 7 ' Thus, the Federal Circuit in Sutermeister agreed with
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Local 2578 that the CSRA does not require
consistent arbitral adherence to MSPB standards or procedures and that arbi-
tration need not produce the same result as would the MSPB in the same case.
The line of cases continued into the following year with two additional
Federal Circuit opinions, Devine v. Brisco76 and Devine v. National Treasury
Employees Union.77 In Brisco the arbitrator had reduced a sixty-day suspen-
sion to thirty days, finding that the agency had unreasonably delayed in im-
posing discipline. In doing so the arbitrator rejected the agency's argument
that the delay was not harmful error. The arbitrator reasoned that since the
collective bargaining agreement was silent with respect to the harmful error
standard, this amounted to a waiver of the statutory standard of review. 8
The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was error for the arbitrator
to mitigate a penalty without requiring the union and the grievant to show
that agency procedural errors were prejudicial to either the grievant's or the
70. 724 F.2d at 1561.
71. See 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981). These standards number twelve in all and include, inter alia,
(1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the employee's job level; (3) any prior discipline;
(4) the employee'., work record; and (5) consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon
other employees for the same or similar offenses. Id. at 329-32.
72. 724 F.2d at 1565.
73. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
74. 718 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
See infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's eventual
resolution of this case.
75. 724 F.2d at 1565 (emphasis therein).
76. 733 F.2d E67 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
77. 737 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
78. 733 F.2d at 869-70.
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union's rights. The court concluded that it was irrelevant that the agreement
was silent as to the harmful error standard since the statute requires such
a showing. Moreover, the court refused to permit agencies to waive their rights
by agreeing to a less rigorous standard of proof."
In NTEU the arbitrator had applied the MSPB's Douglas factors and re-
duced the removal of an employee who had falsified her performance statistics
to an eleven-month suspension. OPM intervened and argued that once charges
are shown to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and a nexus
exists between the charges and the efficiency of the service, the arbitrator
must uphold an agency penalty unless it can be shown to be arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion. OPM further asserted
that this was the standard used by the MSPB and, to the extent Sutermeister
allowed arbitrators to use a different standard, Sutermeister should be over-
ruled. 80 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that discipline cases, because
of their disparate fact patterns, are generally unsuited for appellate review.
The court concluded that in these cases arbitrators are not bound by MSPB
precedent. In fact, the court cited Sutermeister with approval and again stated
that whether the MSPB would have reached a different result is irrelevant.
Mitigation, in the court's view, was a fact-sensitive judgment that should
seldom be disturbed on appeal. 8
This was an interesting result, particularly when compared to Devine v.
Pastore,82 a D.C. Circuit case decided less than three months earlier. In Pastore
the court was asked to review an arbitrator's reduction of an employee's
removal to a thirty-one day suspension. The arbitrator apparently based his
decision to reduce the penalty on the lack of any evidence of progressive
discipline in the case and the absence of a comparable penalty in cases involv-
ing similar employee offenses.83 The court set aside the arbitrator's decision,
however, holding that although an arbitrator need not apply all of the factors
listed in the MSPB's Douglas decision, he must follow Douglas's judicially
approved standard of review. In the D.C. Circuit's view, the arbitrator's deci-
sion operated as a substitution of the arbitrator's judgment of the appropriate
penalty for that of the agency, thereby failing to accord the agency adequate
discretion in disciplining employees.
The court emphasized the need for consistent results, noting that one area
needing uniformity was the standard of review applied in each forum. Although
the arbitrator need not undertake a detailed review of MSPB case law, the
arbitrator does have to apply the MSPB standard of review. Since the arbi-
trator had failed to apply the Douglas standard, the case was remanded for
further consideration not inconsistent with that decision.84 In addition, the
79. Id. at 872-73.
80. 737 F.2d at 1032-33.
81. Id. at 1033.
82. 732 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
83. Id. at 214-15.
84. Id. at 217-18.
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court stated that if on reconsideration the arbitrator still found the agency
discipline unsupportable, he was not to select a discipline he personally believed
was appropriate. Rather, he should merely reduce the penalty to a level "within
the parameters of reasonableness"; or, in other words, he should reduce it
only so much as necessary to bring it to a level that could be sustained."5
As the foregoing line of cases demonstrate, the federal appellate courts have
had several opportunities to address the relationship between arbitral and
MSPB resolution of cases where the grievant had a choice of forum. As
demonstrated by Devine v. White and Local 2578, consistency between the
two procedures is needed in order to prevent forum shopping. Whether this
policy goal extends beyond requiring application of the same standard of review
is questionable, however, in light of the views expressed in Sutermeister and
NTEU that arbitrators are not bound by MSPB precedents when considering
the mitigation of penalties in adverse action cases.
Adding to this confusion is Pastore, where the D.C. Circuit held that an
arbitrator reviewing an agency disciplinary action may not substitute his judg-
ment for that of the agency and that an inappropriate penalty could only
be reduced to a level that could be sustained. Although the Federal Circuit
now has the exclusive jurisdiction over the initial review of these cases,"'
Pastore's well-reasoned assessment of how MSPB standards of review can
effect an arbitrator's substantive power to mitigate a penalty is still persuasive. 7
In any event, the stage was set for Cornelius v. Nutt, where the Supreme
Court had its first opportunity to address the interrelationship between the
standards applied by federal sector arbitrators and those applied by the Merit
Systems Protection Board.
Cornelius v. Nutt
An understanding of the factual and procedural background is necessary
to fully grasp the scope of the Court's holding in Cornelius v. Nutt." Cornel-
ius v. Nutt involved two employees of the General Services Administration,
Thomas Rogers and Robert Wilson. Both were officers in the Federal Protec-
tive Service (FPS). Rogers' job was to patrol federal property near Denver,
Colorado. Wilson worked as a dispatcher at the FPS command center. On
January 7, 1982, Rogers was on patrol in a government car when he received
a request from his shift supervisor to go to the supervisor's home, pick up
85. Id. at 219. This was the guideline set forth in Douglas v. Veteran's Admin., 5 M.S.P.B.
313 (1981), and was apparently the one to be used at arbitration.
86. As a result, Pastore's precedential value is somewhat diminished.
87. In this regard, the D.C. Circuit in Pastore seemed to recognize that its view of arbitral
adherence to MSPB case.law was at odds with that of the Federal Circuit. The former cited
Sutermeister's statement that arbitrators are not bound by MSPB precedents, characterizing it
as "not entirely ,.lear" and as "dictum in any event." More generous toward its own decisions,
calling them "entirey clear" and "correct," the D.C. Circuit had no difficulty in linking arbitral
authority to that of the MSPB. 732 F.2d at 216-17 n.4.
88. 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
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some beer, and deliver it to the supervisor at the command center. Rogers
complied with the request and delivered the beer to his supervisor, which the
latter drank, leaving the empty cans scattered around the command center.
The following day the supervisor became concerned that the presence of the
empty beer cans at the center might lead someone to conclude that he had
been drinking on duty. To cover his tracks, he told Wilson to alter the tape
from the previous day and to provide a false explanation for the presence
of the chns. Wilson complied, but eventually an FPS investigator noted irreg-
ularities on the tape. 89
The GSA's Inspector General conducted an investigation, and Rogers and
Wilson were both brought to a local police station where they were ques-
tioned about their involvement in the incident. Neither was told during the
questioning that he was entitled to have a union representative present. A
month later, they were interviewed again. This time, investigating agents asked
them to sign affidavits made from the agents' notes taken at the earlier inter-
view. Both men signed the affidavits, admitting their involvement in the earlier
wrongdoing. Once again, neither was advised that he could have a union
representative present.90
In early April of 1982, the GSA informed Wilson and Rogers that they
would be removed from the federal service. Wilson was to be removed because
of his falsification of records and his attempt to conceal activities of record;
and Rogers, for falsification of records, failure to report irregularities, and
use of a government vehicle for a nonofficial purpose. Both employees
challenged their removals through grievance arbitration procedures established
under a collective bargaining agreement between their union, the American
Federation of Government Employees, and the GSA. At arbitration, the ar-
bitrator found that Rogers and Wilson had committed the acts alleged and
that such conduct normally would justify removal. The arbitrator, however,
also found that the GSA had committed two procedural errors: it had failed
to give the employees an opportunity for union representation during the ques-
tioning and it permitted an unreasonable period of time to pass before initiat-
ing action. Although the arbitrator concluded that neither error had preju-
diced the employees personally, he still reduced their penalties from removal
to brief disciplinary suspensions without pay, citing "the Agency's pervasive
failure to comply with ... the [collective bargaining] agreement." 9' 1
The Director of OPM sought review of this decision in the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, arguing that the arbitrator had misapplied the CSRA's
harmful error rule. The court of appeals rejected this contention and affirmed
the arbitrator's decision in substantial part. 2 The court upheld the now familiar
89. Id. at 653.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 654-55.
92. Devine v. Nutt, 718 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The court found the arbitrator's penalty
with respect to Rogers to be contrary to law (citing 31 U.S.C § 1349(b) (1982) which requires
one month's suspension for the unauthorized use of a government vehicle) and modified his
two-week suspension to a one-month suspension without pay. Id. at 1055-56.
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principle that arbitrators should take account of the harmful error rule in
deciding whether a grievant has been personally prejudiced. The court noted
and apparently accepted the arbitrator's conclusion that the employees had
suffered no prejudice because of agency errors. Nevertheless, the court held
that violations of certain negotiated procedural rights "could fairly be said
to be tantamount to 'harmful error' to the Union ' 93 and may thus provide
a basis for setting aside or mitigating a disciplinary action against an employee.
The court reasoned that the union was a major party to the collective bargain-
ing agreement and that its interests, standing apart from any individual claim
of prejudicial error, must be protected in federal sector arbitration.
9 4
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
outlined the effect of the harmful error rule as applied in cases where the
employee had a choice between grievance arbitration and an MSPB hearing.
He noted that the CSRA did not define "harmful error" and that the legislative
history covering the concept was inconclusive. Nevertheless, he observed that
the CSRA allows the MSPB to promulgate "regulations to carry out the pur-
poses of ... [section 7701]," 95 and accordingly the MSPB had devised a defini-
tion of harmful error.
Under the vISPB's definition, harmful error by an agency included not
only violations of procedures required by statute, rule, or regulation but also
agency failure to comply with procedures established by the applicable collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 96 The important point in this definition was that
the MSPB would not overturn an agency disciplinary decision unless the pro-
cedural violation "might have affected the result of the agency's decision to
take disciplinary action against the individual employee."
97
The employees and the union did not dispute the Court's interpretation,
but argued that arbitration was different from MSPB proceedings. They argued
that in arbitration a union was a "major party" and, as such, an arbitrator
should take into account the union's interest in having the terms of its collec-
tive bargaining agreement honored as well as considering the rights of the
individual employee. Citing both the legislative history of the CSRA and the
effect of the MSPB definition of harmful error, the Court rejected these con-
tentions, stating: "Congress clearly intended that an arbitrator would apply
the same subs-antive rules as the Board does in reviewing any agency
disciplinary (ecision." 9'
Furthermore, the Senate Report explaining section 7701 states that when
an employee elects to pursue grievance arbitration rather than the statutory
appeals procedures, 9 the arbitrator must apply the same standards that would
be applied by "an administrative law judge or an appeals officer" if the case
93. Id. at 1055.
94. Id. at 1054.
95. 472 U.S. at 657-58 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j) (1982)).
96. Id. at 659.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 660.
99. Section 7701 was originally contained in only the Senate version of the CSRA.
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was decided by the MSPB.' 00 The Court noted that the House-Senate Confer-
ence Committee retained this provision in the Senate bill in order to promote
consistency and discourage forum shopping.
0 1
In short, the Court rejected the respondents' interpretation of harmful er-
ror in the arbitral forum, summing up its position as follows:
Under [the grievant's] interpretation ... an employee who elects
to use the grievance and arbitration procedures may obtain rever-
sal merely by showing that significant violation of the collective-
bargaining agreement, harmful to the union, occurred. In the pre-
sent case, if the disciplined employees had elected to appeal to the
Board, their discharges would have been sustained by the Board
under its interpretation of the harmful error rule .... If respon-
dents' interpretation of the harmful-error rule as applied in [arbitra-
tion] were to be sustained, an employee with a claim that the agency
violated procedures guaranteed by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment would tend to select the forum-the grievance and arbitration
procedures-that treats his claim more favorably. The result would
be the very inconsistency and forum shopping that Congress sought
to avoid. 102
The Court's decision did not, however, rest solely upon deference to the
MSPB's definition of harmful error and congressional intent that there be
consistent results between forums. A more central goal of the CSRA, the need
to maintain effective and efficient government by identifying and removing
substandard federal employees, also entered into the Court's decision. In the
Court's view, there was no question that the employees involved in the case
deserved to be removed from the federal service. The only question was whether
"nonprejudicial procedural mistakes," those mistakes which "cast [no] doubt
upon the reliability of the agency's factfinding or decision," should be weighed
so heavily that they frustrate the CSRA's goal of effective and efficient govern-
ment.' 0 3 The Court declined to interpret the statute in such. manner, impli-
citly concluding that such error would not nullify an otherwis, justified per-
sonnel action. 4
The Court was similarly unimpressed with the contention that arbitral con-
sideration of nonprejudicial procedural error was needed to vindicate the
federal sector collective bargaining process, characterizing this concern as
"overstated."' 05 It reasoned that unions had their own remedy; specifically,
unions have the power to ifile a grievance on their own behalf, and an arbitrator
can handle procedural violations by ordering the agency to "cease and desist."
100. 472 U.S. at 661 (citing S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64, Ill, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmn. NEws 2723, 2833).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 661-62.
103. Id. at 663.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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In addition, where "clear and patent" breaches of the collective bargaining
agreement have occurred, the union can file an unfair labor practice before
the Federal Labor Relations Authority.' 6
Thus, in Cornelius v. Nutt the Supreme Court answered the question of
how an arbitrator should apply the CSRA's harmful error standard in adverse
action cases. Henceforth, the MSPB's definition must be applied at arbitra-
tion. Although the Court's analysis was similar to that of Judge Edwards
in Devine v. White, the Court declined to adopt White's holding that arbitrators
possess the power to remedy procedural violations by reducing the disciplinary
sanctions thereby imposed. Therefore, until the MSPB revises its harmful er-
ror definition or Congress amends the CSRA, arbitrators will be unable to
remedy nonprejudicial agency procedural errors by mitigating agency actions
taken against the grieving employee.
Despite having settled this issue, Cornelius v. Nutt raises other issues that
may continue to confuse the scope of arbitral authority in federal sector cases.
Specifically, given an established rule that arbitrators must adhere to MSPB
standards of review in deciding cases, does it follow that an arbitrator must
also apply the same remedy that the MSPB would have applied had the case
gone through statutory appeal procedures? Earlier cases discussing arbitral
adherence to MSPB precedent certainly raised this issue, but Cornelius v. Nutt
gave no definitive answer. Before addressing this question, however, a brief
overview of the remedial authority vested in these respective forums is
appropriate.
III. Remedies Under the CSRA
MSPB Remedial Powers
Under the provisions of section 1205(a) of the CSRA, the MSPB has broad
powers to remedy improper personnel actions taken by federal agencies. Sec-
tion 1205(a) states that the MSPB can order an agency to take any action
necessary to give effect to MSPB decisions. Meier v. Department of Interior
was one of the Board's earliest assertions of this authority.' 7 In Meier the
Board stated that an improper personnel action would be considered void
and that the most effective way to ensure that the ill effects of the action
are undone is to order the agency to cancel the action. 08
The basic purpose behind a Board cancellation order is to place the employee
as nearly as possible in the status quo ante.' 0 9 Should this have the effect
of placing two employees in one position, as was the case in Meier, the agency
should place one of the employees in another, comparable position." In any
event, the Board is unreceptive to arguments by agencies that they are without
106. Id. at 654.
107. 3 M.S.P.B. 341 (1980).
108. Id. at 34849.
109. Kerr v. Naional Endowment of the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
110. 3 M.S.P.B. at 349.
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the authority to do what the Board has ordered."' Moreover, when an
employee believes that an agency action taken subsequent to a cancellation
order was a reprisal for the employee's exercise of statutory appellate rights,
the employee may petition the Board for an order stopping the harassing ac-
tion, even if such action would not be independently appealable to the Board." 2
Aside from its power to order cancellation, the Board seldom considers
remedies other than reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees." 13 Reinstate-
ment to the employee's prior position is usually implicit in a Board order
to cancel an improper action involving removal, transfer, or demotion. Board
decisions regarding back pay are somewhat perplexing, however. The Board
definitely has the power to award back pay and benefits when it sets aside
an improper removal, demotion, or suspension." 4 Until 1984, however, the
Board's view was that back pay disputes arising from its awards were beyond
its jurisdiction and that these matters were properly left for resolution by the
employee and the agency. The Board was of the opinion that if this did not
produce results, section 71 of title 31 of the United States Code required that
the dispute be resolved by the General Accounting Office.
In Kerr v. National Endowment of the Arts,"' however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit indicated that the MSPB had jurisdiction to en-
sure compliance with its orders. Several months later, the Board held in Robin-
son v. Department of the Army" 6 that pursuant to subsections 1205(a)(1)
(regarding final Board decisions) and 1201(a)(2) (regarding Board authority
to order compliance) of the CSRA, it had the power to order back pay dur-
ing its review of personnel actions subject to its jurisdiction."
7
Section 7701(g) of the CSRA governs the award of attorney's fee in cases
adjudicated before the MSPB. Subsection (1) states that an award of attorney's
fees can be made when it is determined that the employee is a "prevailing
party" and "payment by the agency is warranted in the interest of justice."II8
According to MSPB precedent, a prevailing party is one who obtains all or
111. See, e.g., Matthews v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 4 M.S.P.B. 482 (1980).
112. 3 M.S.P.B. at 350 n.8. See also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181 (1987).
113. But see In re Frazier, 1 M.S.P.B. 268 (1979), a Special Counsel case involving allegations
of reprisals in the form of geographical reassignments. The Board found no improper action,
but noted that it had the power "under its broad corrective authority" to order an employee
made whole (i.e., to order compensation for a financial loss arising from the sale of a home,
sale necessitated by an improper reassignment). Id. at 270 n.4.
114. 5 C.F.R. § 550.805 (1987).
115. 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying note 109.
116. No. SF07528370135 (MSPB Jan. 4, 1985).
117. The Board has apparently struggled with this issue. Compare Tanake v. Department of
the Navy, No. SF07528310321 (MSPB Feb. 24, 1984) (leaving back-pay issues to employee and
agency, subject to GAO resolution), with Spezzaferro v. Federal Aviation Admin., No.
BN075281F0717 (MSPB Feb. 24, 1984) (formerly overruling its past decision denying its role
in back-pay decisions, Board instructs agency to calculate and pay back pay due as result of
Board's decision). See P. BROMA, A GumE TO THE MERrr SYsTEm PRoTEcTIoN BOARD 206-07
(2d ed. 1985) for a discussion of Board vacillations in the area.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1982).
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a significant part of the relief sought.1' 9 The interest of justice criterion, as
interpreted by MSPB decisions, is not coextensive with the prevailing party
requirement.
In Allen v. Postal Service,1' ° for example, the MSPB reversed a presiding
official's determination that any time an employee prevails, the agency action
is "clearly without merit" and a fee award is therefore appropriate. The MSPB
reasoned that the "interest of justice" standard required more than just be-
ing a prevailing party and declared that it would have to be developed on
a case-by-case basis.' 2' In Allen the MSPB provided an "illustrative" list of
circumstances that should be considered. These include considering whether
the agency had engaged in a prohibited personnel practice, whether it had
acted in bad Faith, and whether it "knew or should have known that it would
not prevail on the merits."'' 21 In addition, the MSPB indicated that "gross
procedural error" which prolonged a proceeding or "severely prejudiced an
employee" would weigh in favor of awarding attorney's fees.,
The MSPE: can mitigate penalties in section 7512 discipline cases. 2 4 It em-
phasizes, however, that deference should be given to an agency's decision,
particularly when the decision shows consideration of mitigating factors; and
the MSPB will riot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless,
the MSPB ultimately judges the appropriateness of a disciplinary penalty by
using a standard of reasonableness. The range of factors and circumstances
involved in assessing an agency penalty necessarily trigger case-by-case evalua-
tions. The MSPB requires its presiding officials to determine whether the pen-
alty is within the range allowed by law, rule, or regulation and whether the
penalty is based upon relevant factors. 2 5 As a practical matter, a penalty can
be so grossly disproportionate to an offense that its imposition constitutes
an abuse of discretion.'
26
The same reredial power does not attend Chapter 43 cases, however. In
Lisiecki v. Mrert Systems Protection Board,2 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that the MSPB had no authority to mitigate the severity
of penalties imposed pursuant to section 4303. The court reasoned that the
rationale behind Douglas v. Veteran's Administration did not apply to agency
actions taken on account of unacceptable performance. Congress did not re-
quire proof by a preponderance of the evidence for Chapter 43 cases as it
did for Chapter 75 cases because it wanted fewer obstacles to the removal
119. Hodnick v. Federal Mediation & Conciliation Serv., 4 M.S.P.B. 431, 434 (1980). See
also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterp., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
120. 2 M.S.P.B. 582 (1980).
121. Id. at 592.
122. Id. at 593.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 24, 41-43 and accompanying text.
125. Including those set forth in Douglas v. Veteran's Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981).
126. See, e.g., Miguel v. Department of the Army, 727 F.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (removal
of twenty-four-year employee with unblemished record for unauthorized possession of govern-
ment property (two bars of soap valued at $2.10) was an abuse of discretion).
127. 769 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1514 (1986).
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of incompetent employees. The court reasoned that Chapter 75 penalties are
essentially punitive in nature, while Chapter 43 performance-related actions
are more in line with the CSRA's central goal of ridding the federal service
of substandard employees. In short, "[t]he conclusion ... that the MSPB
could mitigate penalties assessed under Chapter 75 was based on considera-
tions not anywhere present under Chapter 43. '312
A final area of MSPB remedial authority pertains to its power to order
and enforce compliance with its decisions. The MSPB can order an agency
to take such action as ir necessary to assure compliance with its order. In
addition, pursuant to section 1205(d)(2) of the Act, the MSPB has the authority
to enforce its decisions by ordering that any employee shall not be paid dur-
ing any period of noncompliance. 29 Furthermore, the Board has the power
to issue cease and desist orders and to order corrective action.
30
Arbitral Remedial Powers
Arbitrators in the private sector are usually given broad latitude in formu-
lating remedies. Private sector arbitrators are required only to ensure that
their remedies conform to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
except in cases that involve applications of external law.13' The situation in
the federal sector is somewhat different. Although arbitrators are still called
upon to interpret and apply the terms of a negotiated agreement, their task
is complicated by the presence of a maze of laws, rules, and regulations af-
fecting the entire scope of federal sector employment.
Indeed, the term "grievance" has a very broad meaning under the CSRA
and encompasses, among other things, any complaint by an employee, union,
or agency concerning "any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misap-
plication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employ-
ment."' 2 Moreover, regarding actions taken pursuant to either Chapter 43
or Chapter 75, section 7703(c) of the Act provides that a court considering
an appeal from either an MSPB or an arbitration decision shall set aside any
action, findings, or conclusions that are: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; (2) obtained without
compliance with procedures required by law, rule, or regulation; or (3) un-
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, a primary concern of a federal sec-
tor arbitrator is that the remedy he directs is not proscribed or qualified by
a relevant law or regulation.'33
128. Id. at 1566.
129. Stone v. OPM, 5 M.S.P.B. 142 (1981). Presidential appointees are excluded from such
authority of the MSPB.
130. See Barger v. Department of Justice, 10 M.S.P.B. 148, 152 n.9 (1982) (Board announces
that under certain circumstances, it can order an agency to make changes in an employee's per-
sonnel records).
131. See F. EiCoTRi & E. ELKoum, supra note 30, at 285-90.
132. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
133. Although antedating the CSRA, a 1977 General Accounting Office publication contains
guidance which can "assist third parties in fashioning remedies consistent with federal statutes
19871
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Nevertheless, to a large extent the remedial power of federal sector arbitrators
parallels that of the MSPB in cases involving adverse actions or performance-
related actions. For example, like the MSPB, any arbitrator who finds that
an agency's :removal action was improper can set aside the action and order
reinstatement." 4 Similarly, arbitration remedies often include back pay.'"
Under the terms of the Back Pay Act, an arbitrator may award back pay
when the agency action caused a loss of pay to the grievant. Furthermore,
the Federal Labor Relations Authority, citing the same provisions, has upheld
the authority of an arbitrator to grant a retroactive promotion along with
back pay where the agency action also denied the grievant a promotion he
otherwise would have received.' 36
Two separate statutory provisions also provide that the prevailing party in
an arbitration case can be awarded attorney's fees. One is the previously
discussed amendment to the Back Pay Act, which also provides for the award
of attorney's fees in administrative proceedings. The other provision is sec-
tion 7701(g) of the CSRA, which covers the award of attorney's fees incurred
in the course of proceedings before the MSPB. Both provisions are applicable
to arbitral awards of attorney's fees since the Back Pay Act provisions incor-
porate by reference the standard set forth in section 7701(g) of the CSRA.' 37
In essence, these provisions trigger arbitral consideration of attorney's fees
in any case where back pay is awarded. In determining the necessity of an
award of attorney's fees, the arbitrator should consider the same "prevailing
party" and "interest of justice" criteria as used in Board determinations of
the same issue.'
3
1
and regulations." GENERAL AccoursnoNG OFFCE, MAUAL oN REMtDaIs AvArLAB.LE To TraD
PARims IN ADrJoICATING FEDERAL EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES 1 (1977). In addition, the manual
details remedies available for the most common cases requiring third parties to make whole
remedies.
134. See, e.g., Devine v. Sutermeister, 724 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
135. See, e.g., Treasury Dep't, U.S. Customs Serv., 83 F.L.R.R. 2-1671 (1983) (arbitrator
found that employe,.'s lost time was due to retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity;
ordered grievant made whole for lost pay).
Section 5596(b)(1) of the Back Pay Act provides in pertinent part:
An employee of an agency who, on the basis of a timely appeal or an administrative
determination (including a decision relating to a grievance) is found ... to have
been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which has resulted
in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the pay, allowances, or differentials
of the employee-
(A) is entitled ... to receive for the [affected period]-
(i) an amount equal to all or any part of the pay, allowances, or differen-
tials, . . . which the employee normally would have earned or received
during the period if the personnel action had not occurred.
5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978) (as amended by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
136. Veteran':s Admin. Hosp., 4 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 57 (1980).
137. Section 5596(b)(l)(A)(ii) provides that
reasonable attorney fees related to the personnel action which, with respect to any
decision relating to an unfair labor practice or a grievance processed under a pro-
cedure negotiated in accordance with Chapter 71 of this title, shall be awarded
in accordance with Standards established under section 7701(g) of this title.
138. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
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Arbitrators are also empowered to issue cease and desist orders'3 9 and, like
the MSPB, can order an agency to take corrective action. 40 In addition, ar-
bitrators have the authority to mitigate penalties in adverse action cases, 4 '
at least insofar as the MSPB has similar authority in like cases. Unlike the
MSPB, however, the arbitrator's authority over a specific case normally term-
inates upon rendering a final decision. As one commentator has noted: "The
cases are unanimous in supporting [the] principle [that] when the final award
has been rendered ... all power of the arbitrator is exhausted, and any fur-
ther action that they take will be utterly void unless the parties confer new
authority upon [him]."'4 2 This language was cited favorably by the court in
Devine v. White in discussing whether OPM must file a petition for reconsid-
eration with an arbitrator before appealing the case to federal court. 4 3 Thus,
unlike the MSPB, arbitrators possess no extended power to ensure compli-
ance with their decisions.
In sum, federal sector arbitrators appear to have substantial latitude in the
formulation of remedies. As noted earlier, except for a few instances, their
remedial power parallels that of the Board. The arbitrator's inquiry regard-
ing remedies should take into account the applicable collective bargaining agree-
ment, along with any pertinent statutes or regulations, with a view toward
assuring that a proposed remedy does not conflict with their provisions. Never-
theless, excepting awards of back pay, attorney's fees, or other monetary
relief, 44 there appears to be no requirement that a statute or regulation
139. Whether cease and desist orders are truly arbitral remedies has been a matter of debate.
Arbitrator Louis Crane, addressing the National Academy of Arbitrators, observed that when
a court issues an injunction requiring a party to cease and desist from engaging in certain con-
duct, it gains the power to issue a contempt citation in order to compel compliance. On the
other hand, an arbitrator's power after a party violates his cease and desist order is the same
as it was when he issued the order in the first place. Crane, The Use and Abuse of Arbitral
Power, in LABOR ARBITRATION AT THE QUARTER CENTURY MARK, PROC. OF THE TwENTY-Frnm
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEmy OF ARBITRATORS 66-75 (1973). Another commentator,
Stuart Bernstein, termed cease and desist orders as "gratuitous advice in the award." Id. at
79-80. Bernstein added, however, that such a remedy is useful when directed at conduct occur-
ring at the time of the hearing. Id. at 80. See Veteran's Admin. Med. Ctr., 85 F.L.R.R. 2-1107
(1984) (arbitrator ordered an agency to pay a union monetary damages for failing to call a super-
visor as a witness at a hearing).
140. See, e.g., Veteran's Admin. Med. Ctr., 85 F.L.R.R. 2-1107 (1984) (as a result of its
failure to consult with union concerning the selection of job candidates, as required by the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the agency was required to post a notice stating its willingness
to so meet with the union).
141. See discussion supra part I. See, e.g., In re Library of Congress, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
784 (1982) (Rothschild, Arb.) (termination in insubordination case mitigated to suspension without
back pay provided the employee undergo a fitness for duty examination).
142. C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 282 & n.19 (3d ed. 1970).
143. 697 F.2d 421, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (concluding that federal sector arbitrators lacked
authority to grant OPM petitions for reconsideration).
144. One commentator has stated that when the CSRA was enacted, the GAO reevaluated
its statutory authority and its labor-management procedures, and this reevaluation indicated that
"[a]lmost every term and condition of employment of federal employees that involves the pay-
ment of appropriated funds was still under the GAO's statutory jurisdiction." Blatch, The General
1987]
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authorize a specific remedy; it is only important that they not bar it. '
IV. The Effect of Cornelius v. Nutt on Arbitral Remedial Authority
Cornelius v. Nutt held that in an adverse action case where the employee
has a choice of forum between arbitration and the MSPB and chooses the
former, the arbitrator must apply the MSPB's definition of harmful error
when he assesses the impact of agency procedural errors. 146 The Court in Cor-
nelius v. Nutt reversed the arbitrator's overruling of the GSA's deci-
sion to remove the offending employees because the GSA's procedural er-
rors, made in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, were not pre-
judicial and, therefore, did not constitute harmful error. According to the
Court, two factors justified this result. First, the need to promote consistency
between arbitral and MSPB forums could not be met if each forum applied
its own definition of harmful error. Second,. the need to apply a definition
of harmful error that was consistent with the CSRA's purpose of promoting
effective and efficient government would best be served by the removal of
ineffective and inefficient employees.
The effect of this result upon the comparative remedial power of arbitrators
and the MS1PB was not addressed by the Court and remains an open ques-
tion. Cornelius v. Nutt's refusal to condone a system favoring forum shop-
ping arguably s;upports the notion that arbitrators should adhere to MSPB
precedents regarding remedies in cases arising under both Chapter 43 and
Chapter 75. "1 Nevertheless, because of inherent differences between the respec-
tive forums, Cornelius v. Nutt should not be read so broadly and, accord-
ingly, certain differences in the formulation and application of remedies should
still be permitted.
The arguments in favor of coextensive remedial power stem from the Court's
conclusion in Cornelius v. Nutt that Congress intended to promote consis-
tency between forums. As with the disparate application of the harmful error
standard, a predictable disparity between arbitral and MSPB remedy formula-
tion could systematically promote forum shopping and inconsistent re'sults
in like cases.
Accounting Office's Jurisdiction and Federal Labor Relations since Passage of the Civil Service
Reform Act, 39 AaB. J. 31, 36 (1984).
145. See General Serv. Admin. & AFGE, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1028, 1032 (1981) (Rothschild,
Arb.) (arbitrator ruled that an employee harmed by an agency's negligent delay in forwarding
injury compensation forms was not limited to remedies set forth in the Federal Employee's Com-
pensation Act where the damages sought were beyond the scope of the statute). See generally
Hayford, The Impa.ct of Law and Regulation Upon the Remedial Authority of Labor Arbitrators
in the Federal Sector, 37 AR3. J. 28 (1982).
146. See discussion supra part I.
147. Although Cornelius v. Nutt dealt only with an adverse action under Chapter 75, the case's
rationale should also apply with full force to performance-related actions taken under Chapter
43. Employees in such cases may also have a choice of forum and the Supreme Court's emphasis
on consistency would, therefore, be equally relevant. In addition, performance-related actions
obviously trigger concerns over the maintenance of an efficient and effective federal work force,
the other prong of the Court's analysis.
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The potential for forum shopping is more readily apparent when considered
in light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Steger v. Defense Investigative Ser-
vice.' 41 In Steger, Steger challenged the MSPB's order denying him attorney
fees incurred in successfully challenging his removal from the Defense Inves-
tigative Service. The court acknowledged that the MSPB has considerable
discretion in deciding whether an award of attorney fees "is warranted in
the interest of justice"' 4 9 and stated that it would not set aside the MSPB's
decision in this regard unless it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."'5 10
Nevertheless, court delved into relevant MSPB case law in order to test
the MSPB's admittedly discretionary decision. Steger's position was found
to be clearly analogous to that presented in O'Donnell v. Department of In-
terior,' since both cases involved nearly identical failures on the part of the
respective agencies to conduct adequate investigations prior to taking adverse
action. The court thought it untenable that the MSPB did not reach the same
decision and criticized the Board for completely disregarding its own precedent:
[A]s this court had indicated before, an agency is under an obliga-
tion to follow, distinguish, or overrule its own precedent. The Board
cannot, despite its considerable discretion, treat similar situations
dissimilarly and, indeed, can be said to be at its most arbitrary
when it does so. When the Board not only fails, to distinguish its
precedent, but wholly fails to even consider it, the agency's arbi-
trariness is compounded. Such is the case here. 2
Although the Federal Circuit now has jurisdiction over such cases, the
MSPB's duty to adhere to its own precedents, forcefully expressed in Steger,
will likely continue to be good law. In fact, Steger may well represent a
noteworthy statement of the importance of stare decisis in administrative ad-
judication. Thus, Steger's analysis could have a profound impact upon the
"remedy shopping" problem raised but left unresolved by Cornelius v. Nutt.
In sum, if the substance of the Board's remedy in a given case is more
predictable than is the remedy an arbitrator might apply in the same case,153
the risk of forum/remedy shopping would be increased. Indeed, if an arbitrator
is free to disregard Board precedents establishing remedies in similar cases,
and if he is free to adopt a remedy that might be more favorable to the
employee, 154 the situation would be little different from the one condemned
148. 717 F.2d 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
149. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text for discussion of the Board's authority
for awarding attorney's fees.
150. 717 F.2d at 1404.
151. 2 M.S.P.B. 604 (1980).
152. 717 F.2d at 1406 (citations omitted).
153. Predictability is enhanced by the presence of controlling MSPB precedent and the appli-
cation of Steger.
154. Arbitrators are normally not bound by prior arbitration cases unless the parties provide
otherwise. See generally F. ELKouRi & E. EIKouRi, supra note 30, at 419-36; Seitz, The Citation
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by the Supreme Court in Cornelius v. Nutt. In effect, the disparate application
of remedies would not be much different from the disparate application of
the harmful error standard. Both are contrary to congressional intent regard-
ing forum shopping since both invite employees having a choice of forum
to pursue their claims before the forum that promises the best result. The
result could be both a more favorable decision on the merits and a more
favorable remedy. To prevent this frustration of congressional intent, similar
application of remedies in similar cases must be maintained.
Furthermore, there is some support in the CSRA for the proposition that
arbitrators are bound by MSPB decisions establishing the availability of at-
torney's fee awards. An arbitrator's authority to award attorney's fees comes
from a 1978 amendment to the Back Pay Act, which is part of the CSRA.115
Section 5596 of the Back Pay Act specifies that an award of attorney's fees
at arbitration shall be "in accordance with standards established under sec-
tion 7701(g) of the [CSRA]." Section 7701(g) in turn is the MSPB's statutory
guidance regarding the award of attorney's fees.
An early House version of the CSRA provided instead that the FLRA
establish guidelines for awarding attorney's fees in unfair labor practice and
arbitration cases. 116 As the Act developed, however, the legislative statements
evinced an "intent to provide a standard rule on such awards that is consis-
tent with the provisions available to the Merit Systems Protection Board."IsI
Thus, the final version of the CSRA excluded any reference to FLRA authority
in this area, providing instead the standards set forth in section 7701(g).
This interplay between section 5596 of the Back Pay Act and section 7701(g)
of the CSIRA, combined with the relevant legislative history, indicates that
an arbitrator is bound by MSPB precedent with respect to attorney's fee
awards.158 After Cornelius v. Nutt's condemnation of disparate standards that
encourage forum shopping, an arbitrator who disregards MSPB precedent in
this area may be doing so at his peril.
Despite the foregoing arguments favoring interpretation of Cornelius v. Nutt
as a case mandating the formulation of arbitration remedies in light of MSPB
precedents, the balance of considerations favors denying that case such a broad
scope. First, inherent differences between the forums having little to do with
remedies per se, but still affecting their application, favor the distinct formu-
lation and application of remedies. Second, making arbitration remedies con-
form to MSP3 remedies in like cases denigrates the strong interest in arbitral
finality, an interest that already suffers enough under the current state of
of Authority and Precedent in Arbitration (Its Use and Abuse), 38 ARB. J. 58 (1983). Thus,
an arbitrator presented with an earlier arbitration decision probably would not be in the same
predicament as the Board would be in when confronted with one of its previous decisions.
155. See supra part II.
156. 124 CoNa. Rlc. H29176, 29185 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (statements of Mr. Udall).
157. 124 C.Nc;. Rac. S27563 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
158. See Moore, Awarding Attorney's Fees in Federal Sector Arbitration, 37 ARD. J. 38, 42
(1982) (arguing that MSPB cases involving awarding of attorney's fees constitutes precedent for
federal sector arbitrators).
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federal labor law. Finally, when considered in light of the previously decided
cases, Cornelius v. Nutt is more properly read as requiring MSPB and ar-
bitral use of similar standards in reaching their respective results, not as re-
quiring that their respective results regarding remedies be the same.
A broad application of Cornelius v. Nutt could pose additional burdens
upon federal sector arbitration. The first difficulty in equating remedies centers
on the inherent differences between arbitration and MSPB procedures,
specifically the possible presence or absence of relevant actors in the respec-
tive forums. To understand this difference it is necessary to compare the pro-
cedures used in each forum.
In a typical adverse action or performance-related action dispute involving
negotiated procedures, the parties are the employee and his union on one side
and the agency on the other. They will first attempt to resolve the dispute
informally and at the lowest level possible. This approach could involve
something as simple as a consultation between a union representative and an
appropriate agency official. Should this fail to yield results, the parties might
call upon an agency overseer, perhaps its inspector general, to investigate and
make recommendations. In any event, low-level jesolution will be a common
preface to formal arbitration and will vary somewhat depending upon the
terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement." 9 The key point,
however, is that virtually every decision to invoke arbitration on behalf of
a grieving employee is made by the union. 6 ' In essence, the individual employee
will not have a personal right to invoke arbitration since the right attends
to his union, the collective entity that negotiated the procedure in the first place.
In contrast, the employee who opts for MSPB procedures could pursue
his claim by simply writing a letter to the MSPB that identifies the agency
that took the action, the nature of the action, the effective date of the action,
and the action the employee wishes the Board to take. 6 ' An employee may
also indicate whether he desires a hearing and the identity of his represen-
tative. The key distinction is that with the MSPB the employee retains the
power to pursue the action. In addition, he chooses his own representative,
or may even decide to proceed without one.'62 Although this representative
may come from the union, there is no requirement that the union provide,
or that the employee accept, such assistance when the case is going before
the MSPB.
This procedure can ultimately lead to a wide disparity between the claims
advanced at arbitration and those submitted to the MSPB. A union successfully
pursuing a case through arbitration could invoke a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement that requires that a certain remedy be applied in that
159. See generally F. Lovi & R. KAPLAN ARBrrRATION AND THE FEDERAL SECTOR ADVOCATE
1-12 (1982); F. ELKousu & E. ELKOuiu, supra note 30, at 165-68.
160. This circumstance is understandable because seldom will an agency invoke such a proce-
dure in order to have its own actions reviewed by an outside party.
161. See E. BUssEY, supra note 5, at 29.
162. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31 (1987) (regarding employee representation rights before the MSPB).
1987]
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type of case. 63 Moreover, the CSRA itself can be construed as allowing
negotiated limits on arbitral remedial power. Under section 7121(a)(2), "[a]ny
collective bargaining agreement may exclude any matter from ... the
[negotiated] grievance procedures." This provision presumably allows the par-
ties to limit the arbitrator's remedial authority by agreement. 1" Since part
of the arbitrator's function is to apply the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, a negotiated remedy or a limitation on arbitral remedial authority
would control the award's content, provided it did not run afoul of an ap-
plicable statute, rule, or regulation.
A case going before the MSPB might come out differently, however. The
union need not be present in this forum and, therefore, its interest in seeing
its negotiated remedies applied may not be emphasized. Indeed, the employee
may seek (and deserve) a wholly different remedy, a consequence that may
even have prompted his decision to proceed alone before the MSPB. Although
the MSPB is presumably just as competent as an arbitrator to interpret and
apply relevant collective bargaining agreement provisions, the scope of its
remedial power is broad enough to allow it to also fashion other remedies
that correct the agency's wrongful action while still satisfying the employee.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the parties could agree to limit the MSPB's
remedial power in a given case.'" Unlike an arbitration proceeding, the MSPB
is a public agency with a public mandate; it is unlikely to consider its remedial
authority as being subject to any limitations other than those found in ap-
plicable statutes, rules, and regulations.
In sum, the requirement that arbitrators apply the relevant terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, combined with the presence of a union that
will push for enforcement of those terms, may lead arbitrators to formulate
remedies that reflect both collective interests and the interests of the individual
employee.16  Collective interests may be downplayed before the MSPB,
163. See, e.g., Department of Defense (Luke AFB) & AFGE, 82 F.L.R.R. 2-2280 (1982) (award
of temporary promotion in a case where the collective bargaining agreement specified such a
remedy to correct overly long detail to a higher graded position).
164. The D.C. Circuit recognized this possibility in Local 2578, American Fed'n of Gov't
Empl. v. General Serv. Admin., 711 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1983), but because the issue was not
before the court, declined to discuss the extent to which the parties may limit arbitral authority
to mitigate agency actions. Id. at 267 n.19.
165. This issue has not been decided yet.
166. This conclusion also stems from the idea that there are two perspectives from which to
examine arbitral remedial power. One is based on the arbitrator's "legal" authority to formulate
a specific remed) under the labor agreement, or any applicable statute, rule, or regulation. The
other has a policy basis: the assessment of the likely effect of a specific remedy on the collective
bargaining institution. See generally Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L.
REv. 1199 (1962); Stein, Remedies in Labor Arbitration, in CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION, PROC.
oF THE Tmsaarr ANNuAL MEETiNG, NATIONAL ACADEmY OF ARBITRATORS 39 (1960). Nat-
urally, these perspectives are not mutually exclusive and both play an important role in remedy
formulation. Nevertheless, the Court in Cornelius v. Nutt gave short shrift to "collective in-
terests" in reaching its result in that case. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106. An ar-
bitrator at a hearing where a union advocate is present (and making the union presence felt)
will not be so quick to discount the interests of the collective bargaining unit when it comes
to remedies, even though the Court says his test for prejudice must center on harm to the specific
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however, particularly if the union is absent. Minimizing collective interests
would likely lead to a remedy different from the one that would have been
provided had the case gone to arbitration. Thus, requiring coextensive remedies
in each forum may defy tactical factors present in certain cases. These factors
are beyond the control of the respective forums but may still have a pro-
found impact on any remedy that might be devised.
67
Furthermore, the arbitrator's authority over a case ends upon his rendering
of an award, while the MSPB can continue to take steps to assure compliance
well after the date of its decision.' 6 Although this authority does not pertain
directly to the award itself, it is sufficiently linked to remedial authority that
its presence in one forum and absence in the other deserves attention. Apply-
ing the "avoidance of forum shopping" rationale to this situation, one might
argue that it favors employee use of MSPB procedures, especially if the
employee fears that the agency will drag its feet in complying with a decision
setting aside its action.
Although judicial enforcement of an arbitration award would be available,
the advantages of being able to obtain compliance assistance from the same
forum that rendered the original decision could be significant. Board personnel
presumably would already be well-versed in both the history of the case and,
more important, the parties' demonstrated attitude toward the entire situa-
tion. Thus, it could be argued that Congress implicitly sanctioned disparate
remedial powers in some cases by giving the power to enforce compliance
to one forum but not to the other.
A more momentous problem centers on the need for arbitral finality. In
the private sector, the concept of judicial deference to arbitration awards found
its most emphatic expression in the Steelworkers Trilogy."69 In those land-
employee, not the union. In other words, once actual prejudice to the employee is found, there
is little to stop an arbitrator from fashioning a remedy that also takes into account the union's
parallel interests.
167. Along these lines, it is interesting to note the disparity in actual results in the respective
forums. One commentator, Peter P. Broida, has studied OPM statistics and found that through
May 1983, arbitrators had reversed or mitigated adverse actions taken for performance-related
reasons in approximately 39% of their cases; the comparable MSPB rate was 17%. Likewise,
in discipline cases, arbitrators had reversed or mitigated the agency in 52% of their cases; the
MSPB took similar action in just 24% of its disciplinary cases. Broida opines the difference
exists because
[iun the arbitration process, the arbitrator is interested in salvaging the employee;
discharge is considered the industrial equivalent of capital punishment and the penalty
is not sustained absent egregious circumstances or progressive discipline. The Board
tends to protect the employer; a discharge penalty will be sustained absent egregious
circumstances.
P. BROIDA, supra note 117, preface. Regardless of the reasons, there appear to be significant
differences between forums when it comes to employee success rates in cases brought pursuant
to Chapter 43 or Chapter 75. Thus, the congressional intent that choice of forum not turn on
a difference in anticipated outcome may be wishful thinking in light of palpable institutional
differences regarding the reasonableness of agency actions and the propriety of providing relief.
168. See supra part II.
169. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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mark cases, the Supreme Court set forth the limits of judicial review of arbi-
tration awards and emphasized the importance of according finality to those
awards: "The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award
is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.
The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be under-
mined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards. '"" Although
arbitrators were not turned loose to mete out their "own brand of industrial
justice," ary award that "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement is entitled to judicial deference."' 7 1 The Court reasoned that arbi-
tration is faster and cheaper than conventional litigation in resolving labor
disputes, better-suited to maintain industrial peace, and, because of the special
expertise of arbitrators, more responsive to industrial needs.7 2 Although the
concept of judicial deference has suffered some setbacks over the years,'"
it is still "so well-established as to need little defense.'1
7 4
Judicial deference to arbitration ought to apply in federal sector labor rela-
tions as well. Concerns of economy, efficiency, and stable labor relations are
as important as in the private sector. Even though they may be required to
go well beyond contract interpretation and application, federal sector arbitra-
tors can contribute considerable expertise to the dispute resolution process
and the maintenance of healthy labor relations. As Judge Edwards observed
in Devine v. White, "the typical adverse action case represents issues identical
to those with which labor arbitrators deal on an everyday basis.""' Moreover,
language in the CSRA itself indicates that Congress intended for courts to
defer to arbitration. In "pure grievance" cases, 7 , which are appealable to
the Federal Labor Relations Authority only, an abritration award can be set
aside only if it is "contrary to any law, rule, or regulation" or otherwise
deficient on "grounds similar to those applied by Federal Courts in private
sector labor management relations. ' ' I77
The standard of review applicable to arbitration awards in adverse action
and performance-related cases, though somewhat different from the one ap-
plied in pure grievance cases, is similarly deferential. Sections 7121(f) and
170. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.
171. Id. at 597.
172. See C. UPDEORAPF, supra note 142, at 21-23; R. GoRMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW
541-43 (1976).
173. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employees' right, pur-
suant to Fair Labor Standards Act, to bring minimum wage claim in federal court and have
matter considered in a trial de novo was not precluded by prior submission of the same dispute
to arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (employee's statutory right
to a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not precluded by prior
submission of the same matter to binding arbitration). See also Feller, The Coming End of Arbi-
tration's Golden Age, in ARBITRATioN-1976, PROC. OF THlE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUA. MaaTiNo,
NATIONAL Ac,WBMY OF ARBrrRATORS 97 (1976).
174. Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
175. Id. at 439.
176. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (emphasis added).
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7703(c) of the Act, when read together, permit setting aside arbitration awards
that are (1) arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) obtained
without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation; or (3) unsupported
by substantial evidence.17 It has been argued that in devising this latter stan-
dard of review, Congress deviated from private sector notions of judicial
deference to arbitration. The D.C. Circuit considered this issue in Devine v.
White and concluded that Congress intended to leave arbitrator interpretations
of collective bargaining agreements largely unreviewable. In Judge Edwards'
view, an arbitration award would withstand judicial review if the arbitrator
has not "erred as a matter of law in interpreting a civil service law, rule,
or regulation." This standard of review "is at least as deferential as the stan-
dard governing review of arbitral decisions in the private sector." '179
It is particularly important to note the absence of any mention in the case
law of arbitral adherence to MSPB precedents regarding remedies. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v. Nutt, insofar as it requires arbitra-
tors to apply the MSPB's definition of harmful error, can be construed as
a clear affront to well-established concepts of arbitral finality. Although the
MSPB definition of harmful error could be deemed a "rule" that an arbitrator
must apply or else risk having his award set aside, 8 ' there is no CSRA provi-
sion saying that an arbitrator must apply a remedy coextensive with the one
the MSPB would apply in the same case. Similarly, no CSRA provision sup-
ports the proposition that a court of appeals should set aside an arbitration
award simply because its remedy fails to conform with one ordered by the
Board in a similar case. To read such provisions into the Act would only
encumber the arbitration process with further complications and risk its pre-
ferred status as a fast, economical, and final method of grievance resolution.
Furthermore, even court decisions in the aftermath of Cornelius v. Nutt
support the conclusion that arbitrators need not apply the same remedies as
would the MSPB. In both Local 2578 and Sutermeister,'8' the courts addressed
the standard of review applied by arbitrators. Although Cornelius v. Nutt
determined the test for prejudice, Local 2578 and Sutermeister both drew con-
clusions about arbitral adherence to MSPB precedent that still bear upon the
remedies issue. In Local 2578 the D.C. Circuit unequivocally stated that
"nothing in the CSRA requires that arbitration and MSPB actions. . . produce
the same results in like cases."'82 Sutermeister cited this language with ap-
proval and concluded that the legislative history of the CSRA did not support
"the proposition that an arbitrator is . . .bound by MSPB precedents."' 3
Seemingly, these cases stand for the proposition that since Congress desired
178. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(f), 7703(c) (Supp 11 1978). See also Devine v. White, 697 F.2d at 439.
179. 697 F.2d at 440.
180. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121(f), 7703(c) (1982).
181. Devine v. Sutermeister, 724 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Local 2578, American Fed'n
of Gov't Empl. v. General Serv. Admin., 711 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
182. 711 F.2d at 264 (Edwards, J.) (emphasis added).
183. 724 F.2d at 1565 (arbitrator mitigated a penalty).
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consistency between forums, both arbitrators and the MSPB must apply the
same standards of review in deciding cases where the grievant had a choice
of forum. Applying the same standard of review, however, does not necessarily
mean that each forum has to order the same remedy or even to reach the
same result in a given case. It only means that each forum must follow the
same legal avenue in reaching its result and in formulating an appropriate
remedy. The outcome, and any attendant remedies, may still vary in like cases.
The D.C. Circuit seemed to recognize this in Local 2578 when it held that
both forums necessarily had the same power to mitigate, yet they need not
yield the same result. Indeed, because of the inherent subjectivity involved
in most of these cases, disparate results may be unavoidable.
Such was the Federal Circuit's conclusion in NTEU, 1 4 and this may well
reflect an unavoidable fact of life in a grievance resolution scheme that allows
multiple forums. For example, in an adverse action case raising issues of mitiga-
tion, either the Board or an arbitrator, each applying the Douglas standards,
could easily order different remedies in response to an indefensibly harsh agency
action. Such disparate results should not be construed as an invitation to forum
shop, however. Rather, they are simply unavoidable variances that are the
product of what is actually an open-ended, amorphous test of reasonableness.
So long as the respective forums apply the same standards in formulating
remedies, there should be no advance indication as to the remedies either forum
might order.'8 Accordingly, so long as the arbitrator has applied the proper
standard of review before affirming or adjusting an agency action,' 86 his results
should not be subject to further attack simply because an earlier MSPB case,
close on the facts, had a different remedy. Likewise, so long as an arbitrator
has faithfully applied the MSPB's test as set forth in Allen v. Postal Service,' 87
his award of attorney's fees should not be reversed. 8
As Judge Scalia cogently stated in Pastore:
We do not suggest that the arbitrator must conduct an examination
of the MSPB case law, in the manner of a common law judge,
to assure himself that the outcome of his determination is similar
to the MSPB case closest on its facts. But it must be clear, at least,
that he is making a conscientious application of the judicially ap-
proved MSPB standard. Only in this manner can there be assured
that rough uniformity which is necessary in the review of federal
agency disciplinary action. 89
184. 737 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
185. But see supra notes 158-166 and accompanying text for a discussion on how the current
regime of federal sector labor regulations may systematically promote disparate remedial power.
186. Douglas in Chapter 75 cases and Lisiecki in Chapter 43 cases.
187. 2 M.S.P.B. 582 (1980).
188. The proper application of Allen v. Postal Service is something the Board itself failed
to do in Steger. See supra note 148. In this light, arbitrators faced with this issue should carefully
consider MSPB foe award cases similar to the one under construction. Should a contrary result
be envisioned, the similar MSPB case or cases should be either distinguished in light of the criteria
set forth in Aller, v. Postal Service, or followed.
189. 732 F.2d 213, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
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This statement of the law is as valid now as it was before Cornelius v. Nutt.
As long as arbitrators apply the same standards the MSPB would apply in
determining the propriety of mitigation, reinstatement, back pay, attorney's
fees, or any other remedial measure that could be awarded in either forum,
there is little cause for concern that the remedies ordered are different from
the ones that MSPB would order on the same facts. Disparities of this nature
are a natural and acceptable by-product of this dual system of employee
grievance resolution. Because of the need for both remedial flexibility and
timely grievance resolution, such disparities should not be a reason for upsetting
arbitration awards where there has been a conscientious application of the
relevant MSPB standards.
Conclusion
Despite the need for consistency between arbitral and MSPB forums, the
disparate formulation and application of remedies in like cases is unavoidable.
Since Congress implicitly allows different remedial powers, it is likely that
Congress believed some degree of disparity was acceptable even though its
intent otherwise was to emphasize consistency. This is especially true where
arbitrators have consciously sought to apply MSPB standards and procedures
in arriving at an appropriate remedy. Any difference in remedies actually devised
would reflect the inescapable fact that reasonable people can differ as to pre-
cisely what needs to be done to make an injured employee whole.
Moreover, given the largely symmetric power between forums with respect
to the basic remedies (reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees), grievants
are not likely to base their forum choice on an expectation of quantum dif-
ferences in remedial relief. Indeed, an employee with a meritorious claim is
more likely to choose a forum based on where he has the best chance of prevail-
ing on the merits. Although remedies are certainly of great importance, they
are of little use when one's entitlement to them cannot be established. For
these reasons, an arbitrator's general discretion to formulate remedies consis-
tent with the applicable collective bargaining agreement and relevant statutes,
rules, and regulations, should remain intact despite counterarguments based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v. Nutt.
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